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Objectives 
 
Readers of this chapter should be in a better position to: 
 
• Understand the process of research design 
• Place their own and others work within a full cycle or programme of ongoing 
research 
• Understand why good research almost always involves a mixture of evidence 
• Defend themselves from those who want numbers and text to be enemies 
rather than allies 
• Argue that good research is more ethical for society than poor research 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The term ‘mixed methods’ is generally used to refer to social science research that 
combines evidence (or techniques or approaches) deemed both ‘quantitative’ and 
‘qualitative’ in one study (e.g., Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004;  Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2007). However mixed methods work is described, the key element seems to 
be this combination of quantitative and qualitative work at some level. It also appears 
that social science researchers as a body, and commentators on mixed methods in 
particular, view quantitative research as involving numbers, measurement and often 
forms of analysis based on sampling theory. Qualitative research, on the other hand, 
is viewed as almost anything not involving numbers, commonly text and discourse, 
but also images, observations, recordings and, on rare occasions, smell and other 
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sensory data. Each type of research has a specialist vocabulary, and an underlying 
philosophy, purportedly making each type of research a paradigm incommensurable 
with the other. Mixed methods approaches are therefore seen as complex, difficult 
and innovative because they seek to combine both of the q-word paradigms in the 
same study or research programme. 
 
I was not fully aware of these paradigms, and their attendant beliefs, like positivism 
and interpretivism, when I started my PhD study as an educational practitioner. In 
that early study of school choice, I naturally used a variety of methods and techniques 
from simple re-analysis of existing datasets, documents, and archives through 
complex modelling of a bespoke survey, to in-depth observations and interviews 
(Gorard, 1997a). This seems to me what any novice researcher would do naturally 
(unless contaminated by the nonsense peddled in mainstream methods resources). 
Doing so seemed to cause me no problems, other than the time and effort involved, 
and I felt that my conclusions were drawn logically from an unproblematic synthesis 
of the various forms of evidence. It was only once I was underway that I discovered 
that methods experts believed what I was doing was wrong, impossible, or at least 
revolutionary in some way. In fact, what I did was none of those things. It seemed 
quite normal for anyone who genuinely wanted to find out the answer to their 
research questions, and from that time I began to try and explain to these experts and 
authorities why (Gorard,1997b). In the 12 years since my PhD I have completed 
about 60 projects large and small, and had about 600 publications of all types. In 
nearly all cases, I have continued to mix the methods known to others as quantitative 
and qualitative, both in the ‘new political arithmetic’ style of my PhD and in a variety 
of different styles including Bayesian syntheses, complex interventions, and design 
studies (e.g., Gorard, Taylor, & Fitz, 2003; Selwyn, Gorard, & Furlong, 2006; 
Gorard, et al. 2007). I have also continued to write about methods, including why 
quantitative work is misunderstood both by its advocates and by its opponents (e.g. 
Gorard, 2006, 2010), how misuse of the term ‘theory’ by advocates of qualitative 
research has become a barrier to mixed methods (e.g., Gorard, 2004a, 2004b), the 
ethics of mixing methods (e.g., Gorard, 2002a; Gorard with Taylor, 2004), and most 
importantly about the underlying universal logic of all research (e.g., Gorard, 2002b, 
2002c).  
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Yet postgraduate students and new researchers in the UK are still routinely (mis-
)taught about the incommensurable paradigms, and how they must elect one or other 
approach. Subsequently, they may be told that they can mix methods (if that is not a 
contradiction), and perhaps even told that a mixed methods approach is a third 
paradigm that they can choose (a bit like a fashion accessory). But the damage has 
been done by then. These new researchers may now view research evidence as a 
dichotomy of numbers and everything that is not numbers, and will reason that even 
if they can mix the two the fact of mixing suggests separate ingredients in the first 
place. If they are hesitant to work with numbers, they will tend to select the 
qualitative paradigm, and so convert their prior weakness in handling an essential 
form of evidence into a pretend bulwark and eventually a basis for criticising those 
who do use numbers. Those less hesitant with numbers will tend to find that the 
system both forces them to become quantitative (because it is only by opposites that 
the paradigms can be protective bulwarks) and positively encourages them as well, 
since there is a widespread shortage of social scientists willing and able to work with 
numbers in UK education research. For example, I review papers for around 50 
journals internationally and I rarely get papers to review in the areas I work in. The 
common denominator to what I am sent is numbers. Editors send me papers with 
numbers not because I ask for them but because, unlike the majority of people in my 
field, I am prepared to look at them. Thus, I become, in their minds, a quantitative 
expert even though I am nothing of the sort, and have done as many interviews, 
documentary, archival, video and other in-depth analyses as most qualitative experts.  
 
I believe that there is a different way of presenting the logic of research, not 
involving this particular unhelpful binary, through consideration of design and the 
full cycle of research work. I illustrate such an approach in this chapter, first looking 
at the relationship between methods and design and then between methods and the 
cycle. The chapter continues with a consideration of the differences between the q-
word approaches. It ends with a consideration of the possible implications, if the 
argument thus far has been accepted, for the conduct of research, its ethics, and the 
preparation of new researchers. Of course, to my mind, the law of parsimony should 
mean that it is not necessary for me to argue in favour of an overall logic to social 
science research with no schism and no paradigms (as that term is used here, rather 
than as the fluid conversion of questions into puzzles as discussed by Kuhn and 
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others). But it may be interesting for those imbued with ‘isms’ at least to understand 
my point of view.  
 
 
Research design in social science: the forgotten element? 
 
Research design in the social sciences, as elsewhere, is a way of organising a 
research project or programme from inception in order to maximise the likelihood of 
generating evidence that provides a warranted answer to the research questions for a 
given level of resource. The emphasis is less on how to conduct a type of research 
than on which type is appropriate in the circumstances (Hakim, 2000). In the same 
way that research questions can evolve as a project unfolds, so can its design(s). The 
structure of a standard design is not intended to be restrictive, since designs can be 
easily used in combination; nor is it assumed that any off-the-shelf existing design is 
always or ever appropriate. Instead, consideration of design at the outset is intended 
to stimulate early awareness of the pitfalls and opportunities that will present 
themselves, and through knowledge of prior designs to simplify subsequent analysis, 
and so aid warranted conclusions.  
 
There are many elements to consider in a research design, but they commonly 
include the treatment or programme to be evaluated (if there is one), the data 
collected, the groups and sub-groups of interest, the allocation of cases to groups or 
to treatments (where appropriate), and what happens over time (unless the study is a 
snapshot). Any design or project may have only some of these elements. Perhaps the 
most common type of design in social science involves no treatment, no allocation to 
groups, and no consideration of time. It is cross-sectional with one or more pre-
existing groups. It is also often described as ‘qualitative’ in the sense that no 
measurements are used, and the data are often based on interviews. It is this design 
that makes it hardest to warrant any claims, since there is usually no comparison 
between groups or over time or place. But actually this design does not entail any 
specific kind of data, any more than any other design. In fact, nothing about 
consideration of treatments, data collection, groups, allocation and time entails a 
specific kind of evidence. Most designs seem to me to be an encouragement to use a 
variety of data. Standard designs can be classified in a number of ways, such as 
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whether there is a treatment or intervention (active) or not (passive). Active designs 
include: 
 
• Randomised control trials (with or without blinds) 
• Quasi-experiments – including interrupted time series 
• Natural experiments 
• Action research 
• Design studies  
and some might say  
• Participant observation.  
 
Passive designs include: 
 
• Cohort studies (time series and retrospective) 
• Other longitudinal designs 
• Case-control studies 
• New political arithmetic 
• Cross-sectional studies 
and some might say 
• Systematic reviews (including Bayesian) 
 
The choice depends largely on the kind of claims and conclusions to be drawn, and to 
a lesser extent on the practicalities of the situation and resources available. I say these 
are lesser considerations because if it is not possible for financial, ethical or other 
reasons to use a suitable design then the research should not be done at all (as 
opposed to being done badly, and perhaps leading to inappropriate claims to 
knowledge). The need for warranted conclusions requires the researcher to identify 
the kind of claims to be made – such as descriptive, associative, correlational or 
causal – and then ensure that the most appropriate possible design is used. Put 
simply, a comparative claim must have an explicit and suitable comparator, for 
example. The warranting principle is based on this consideration - if the claim to be 
drawn from the evidence is not actually true then how else could the evidence be 
explained? The claim should be the simplest explanation for the available evidence. 
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What the design should do is eliminate (or at least test or allow for) the greatest 
possible number of alternate explanations. In this way, the design eases the analysis 
process, and provides part of the warrant for the research claims.  
 
What all of these designs, and variants of them, have in common is that they do not 
specify the kind of data to be used or collected. At the level of an individual study, 
the research design used by social scientists will be independent of, and logically 
prior to, the methods of data collection and analysis employed. No kinds of data, and 
no particular philosophical predicates, are entailed by common existing design 
structures such as longitudinal, case study, randomised controlled trial, or action 
research. A good intervention, for example, could and should use a variety of data 
collection techniques to understand whether something works, how to improve it, or 
why it does not work. Experiments can use any kind of data as outcomes, and collect 
any kind of data throughout to help understand why the outcomes are as they are. 
Longitudinal studies can collect data of all types over time. Case studies involve 
immersion in one real-life scenario, collecting data of any kind ranging from existing 
records to ad hoc observations. And so on.  
 
Mixed methods approaches are therefore not a kind of research design; nor do they 
entail or privilege a particular design. Of course, all stages in research can be said to 
involve elements of ‘design’. The sample design is one example, and the design of 
instruments for data collection another. But research design, as usually defined in 
social science research, and as discussed here, is a prior stage to each of these (de 
Vaus, 2001).  
 
 
The cycle of research  
 
At the meta-level of a programme of research conducted by one team, or a field of 
research conducted by otherwise separate teams, the over-arching research design 
will incorporate most methods of data collection and analysis. Figure 1 is a simplified 
description of a full cycle for a research programme (for a fuller description and 
discussion, see Middleton, Gorard, Taylor, & Bannan- Ritland, 2008). It is based on a 
number of sources, including the genesis of a design study (Gorard with Taylor, 
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2004), the UK Medical Research Council model for undertaking complex medical 
interventions (MRC, 2000) and one OECD conception of what useful policy research 
looks like (Cook & Gorard, 2008). The cycle is more properly a spiral which has no 
clear beginning or end, in which activities (phases) overlap, can take place 
simultaneously, and iterate. Nevertheless, the various phases should be recognisable 
to anyone working in areas of applied social science, like public policy. Starting with 
draft research questions, the research cycle might start with a synthesis of existing 
evidence (phase 1 here). Ideally this synthesis would be an inclusive review of the 
literature both published and unpublished (perhaps combining the different kinds of 
evidence via a Bayesian approach – Gorard, Roberts, & Taylor, 2004), coupled with 
a re-analysis of relevant existing datasets of all kinds (including data archives and 
administrative datasets), and related policy/practice documents. It is not possible to 
conduct a fair appraisal of the existing evidence on almost any real topic in applied 
social science without naturally combining evidence involving text, numbers, 
pictures, and a variety of other data forms. Anyone who excludes relevant data 
because of its type (such as text or numeric) is a fake researcher, not really trying to 
find anything out. 
 
Figure 1 – An outline of the full cycle of social science research and development  
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Currently, the kind of comprehensive synthesis outlined above is rare. If more took 
place, one consequence might be that a research programme more often ended at 
phase 1, where the answers to the research questions are already as well established 
as social science answers can be. Another consequence might be that researchers 
more often revised their initial questions suitably before continuing to other phases of 
the cycle (White, 2008). For example, there is little point in continuing to investigate 
why the attainment gap between boys and girls at school is increasing if initial work 
shows that the gap is actually decreasing (Gorard, Rees, & Salisbury 2001). The 
eclectic reuse of existing evidence would often be more ethical than standard practice 
(a patchy literature review), making better and more efficient use of the taxpayer and 
charitable money spent on the subsequent research. 
 
Similarly, where a project or programme continues past phase 1, every further phase 
in the cycle would tend to involve a mixture of methods. Each phase might lead to a 
Phase 4 
Prototyping 
and trialling 
Phase 1 
Evidence 
synthesis 
Phase 6 
Rigorous 
testing 
Phase 7 
Dissemination 
impact and 
monitoring 
Phase 2 
Development 
of idea or 
artefact 
Phase 3 
Feasibility 
studies 
Phase 5 
Field studies 
and design 
stage 
Examples of 
feedback loops 
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realisation that little more can be learnt and that the study is over, or that the study 
needs radical revision and iteration to an earlier phase(s), or progression to a 
subsequent phase. The overall programme might be envisaged as tending towards an 
artefact or ‘product’ of some kind. This product might be a theory (if the desired 
outcome is simply knowledge), a proposed improvement for public policy, or a 
tool/resource for a practitioner. In order for any of these outcomes to be promoted 
and disseminated in an ethical manner they must have been tested (or else the 
dissemination must merely state that they seem a good idea but that we have no real 
idea of their value). A theory, by definition, will generate testable propositions. A 
proposed public policy intervention can be tested realistically and then monitored in 
situ for the predicted benefits, and for any unwanted and undesirable side effects. 
Therefore, for that minority of programmes which continue as far as phase 6 in 
Figure 1, rigorous testing must usually involve a mixture of methods and types of 
evidence in just the same way as phase 1. Even where a purely numeric outcome is 
envisaged as the benefit of the research programme (such as a more effective or cost-
efficient service) it is no good knowing that the intervention works if we do not also 
know that it is unpopular and likely to be ignored or subverted in practice. Similarly, 
it would be a waste of resource, and therefore unethical, simply to discover that an 
intervention did not work in phase 6 and so return to a new programme of study in 
phase 1. We would want to know why it did not work, or perhaps how to improve it, 
and whether it was effective for some regular pattern of cases but not for others. So in 
phase 6, like phase 1, the researcher or team who genuinely wants to find something 
out will naturally use a range of methods and approaches including measurement, 
narrative and observation.  
 
The same kind of conclusion could be reached for every phase in Figure 1. Even 
monitoring and evaluation of the rollout of the results (phase 7) is best done by using 
all and any data available. Even in simple academic impact terms, a citation count for 
a piece of research gives no idea of the way in which it is used (just mentioned or 
fundamental to the new work of others), nor indeed whether the citation is critical of 
the research and whether it is justified in being critical. On the other hand, for a 
widely cited piece of research, reading in-depth how the research has been cited in a 
few pieces gives no idea of the overall pattern. Analysing citation patterns and 
reading some of the citing pieces – perhaps chosen to represent features of the overall 
10 
 
pattern – gives a much better indication of the impact of this research. Methods of 
data collection and analysis are not alternatives; they are complementary. Specific 
methods might be used to answer a simple, perhaps descriptive, research question in 
one phase, but even then the answer will tend to yield more complex causal questions 
that require more attention to research design (Cook and Gorard, 2008).  
 
Across all stages of the cycle up to definitive testing, engineering of results into 
useable form, and subsequent rollout and monitoring, different methods might have a 
more dominant role in any one stage, but the overall process for a field of endeavour 
requires a full range of research techniques. It is indefensible for a researcher, even 
one limited in expertise to one technique (and so admitting that they are not 
competent to conduct even something as basic as a comprehensive literature review, 
for example), to imagine that they are not involved in a larger process that ‘mixes’ 
methods naturally and automatically. 
 
 
Re-considering the schism 
 
Therefore, the q-word dichotomy has, as illustrated, no relevance to design or indeed 
to entire programmes of research. We may consider that surveys and interviews, for 
example, are quite different, but even here there may be a continuum through 
structured interview schedules to open-ended survey items delivered face-to-face. 
The q-word division is not helpful even with methods. Is there such a thing as a 
qualitative interview and a quantitative interview?  I doubt it. Interview, as a general 
category, is enough. The q-words add nothing. So what lies beneath the schism? I 
consider here three general propositions – that the schism arises from important 
differences in paradigm, scale, and methods of data analysis.  
 
The q-words are not paradigms 
 
In the sociology of science the notion of a 'paradigm', is a description of the sets of 
socially accepted assumptions that tend to appear in 'normal science' (Kuhn, 1970). A 
paradigm is a set of accepted rules within any field for solving one or more puzzles – 
where a puzzle is defined as a scientific question that it is possible to find a solution to 
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in the near future, to distinguish it from the many important and interesting questions 
that do not have an answer at any particular stage of progress (Davis, 1994). 'Normal 
science' in Kuhnian terms is held together, rightly or wrongly, by the norms of 
reviewing and acceptance that work in that taken-for-granted theoretical framework. A 
paradigm shift occurs when that framework changes, perhaps through the 
accumulation of evidence, perhaps due to a genuinely new idea, but partly through a 
change in general acceptance. Often a new paradigm emerges because a procedure or 
set of rules has been created for converting another more general query into a puzzle. 
But, what Kuhn saw as normal science could also be simply passive and uncritical 
rather than genuinely cumulative in nature. It could be based on practices that differ 
from those stated, because of deceit, either of the self or the audience (Lakatos, 1978, 
p.44), and because researchers conceal their actual methodological divergence in 
practice (Gephart, 1988). 
 
However, instead of using 'paradigm' to refer to a topic or field of research (such as 
traditional physics) which might undergo a radical shift on the basis of evidence (to 
quantum physics, for example), some commentators now use it to refer to a whole 
approach to research including philosophy, values and method (Perlesz and Lindsay, 
2003). The most common of these approaches are qualitative and quantitative, even 
though the q-words only make sense, if they make sense at all, as descriptions of data. 
These commentators tend to use the term paradigm conservatively, to defend 
themselves against the need to change, or against contradictory evidence of a different 
nature to their own. Their idea of paradigm appears to defend them because they 
pointlessly parcel up unrelated ideas in methodology (as explained in Chapter Four of 
this collection). The idea of normal science as a collection of individuals all working 
towards the solution of a closely defined problem has all but disappeared. Instead, we 
have paradigm as a symptom of scientific immaturity. The concept of paradigm has, 
thus, become a cultural cliché with so many meanings it is now almost meaningless. 
And many of the terms associated with paradigms – the ‘isms’ such as positivism – 
are used almost entirely to refer to others, having become intellectually acceptable 
terms of abuse and ridicule (see also Hammersley, 2005).  
 
Unfortunately, some novice research students can quickly become imprisoned within 
one of these fake qualitative and quantitative 'paradigms’. They learn, because they 
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are taught, that if they use any numbers in their research then they must be positivist 
or realist in philosophy, and they must be hypothetico-deductive or traditional in style 
(see, for example, such claims by Clarke, 1999). If, on the other hand, students 
disavow the use of numbers in research then they must be interpretivist, holistic, and 
alternative, believing in multiple perspectives rather than truth, and so on. Sale, 
Lohfeld, and Brazil (2002), for example, claim that ‘The quantitative paradigm is 
based on positivism. Science is characterized by empirical research’ (p.44). Whereas, 
‘In contrast, the qualitative paradigm is based on… multiple realities. [There is] no 
external referent by which to compare claims of truth’ (p.45). Such commentators 
‘evidently believe that the choice of a research method represents commitment to a 
certain kind of truth and the concomitant rejection of other kinds of truth' (Snow, 
2001, p.3). They consider that the value of their methods can be judged completely 
separately from the questions they are used to answer. 
 
What is ironic about this use of the term ‘paradigm’ to refer to a methods- and value-
based system in social research is that it has never been intended to be generally 
taken-for-granted, in the way that ‘normal science’ is. Rather, it splits the field into 
two non-communicating parts. Therefore, a paradigm of this kind cannot be shifted by 
evidence, ideas, or the fact that others reject it. It becomes divisive and conservative 
in nature, leading to ‘an exaggeration of the differences between the two traditions’ 
(Gray & Densten, 1998, p.419) and an impoverishment of the range of methods 
deployed to try and solve important social problems.  
 
It is somewhat impractical to sustain an argument that all parts of all methods, 
including data collection, carry epistemological or ontological commitments anyway 
(Frazer, 1995; Bryman, 2001). So, researchers tend to confuse the issues, shuttling 
from technical to philosophical differences, and exaggerating them into a paradigm 
(Bryman, 1988). No research design implies either qualitative or quantitative data 
even though reviewers commonly make the mistake of assuming that they do – that 
experiments can only collect numeric data, observation must be non-numeric, and so 
on. Observation of how work is conducted shows that qualitative and quantitative 
work are not conducted in differing research paradigms, in practice. The alleged 
differences between research paradigms (in this sense) prevail in spite of good 
evidence, not because of it (Quack theories, 2002). 
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Mixed methods have been claimed to be a third paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004), but this seems to add to the confusion by apparently confirming the validity of 
the first two, instead of simply blowing them all away by not mentioning any of them 
in  the development of new researchers. World views do not logically entail or 
privilege the use of specific methods (Guba, 1990), but may only be thought to be so 
due to a common confusion between the logic of designing a study and the method of 
collecting data (according to de Vaus, 2001; Geurts & Roosendaal, 2001). 'The 
researcher's fidelity to principles of inquiry is more important than allegiance to 
procedural mechanics... Research should be judged by the quality and soundness of 
its conception, implementation and description, not by the genre within which it is 
conducted' (Paul & Marfo, 2001, pp. 543-545). In real-life, methods can be separated 
from the epistemology from which they emerge, so that qualitative work is not tied to 
a constructivist paradigm, and so on (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). The paradigm 
argument for the q-word approaches is a red herring, and unnecessarily complex to 
boot (as evidenced in some of the other chapters in part one of this collection). 
 
Not just an issue of scale 
 
Some authorities suggest that a clear difference between the q-word approaches is 
their scale (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007), with qualitative data collection 
necessarily involving small numbers of cases, whereas quantitative relies on very 
large samples in order to increase power and reduce the standard error. This is 
misleading for two reasons. First, it is not an accurate description of what happens in 
practice. Both Gorard & Rees (2002) and Selwyn, Gorard & Furlong (2006) 
interviewed 1,100 adults in their own homes, for example, and treated the data 
gathered as individual life histories. This is larger-scale than many surveys. On the 
other hand, Smith & Gorard (2005) conducted a field trial in one school with only 26 
students in the treatment group, yielding both attainment scores and contextual data. 
The number of cases is not necessarily related to methods of data collection or to 
either of the q-words. Second, issues such as sampling error and power only relate to 
a tiny minority of studies where a true and complete random sample is used or where 
a population is randomly allocated to treatment groups. In the much more common 
situations of working with incomplete samples with measurement error or dropout, 
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convenience, snowball and other non-random samples and the increasing amount of 
population data available to us, the constraints of sampling theory are completely 
irrelevant. It is also the case that the standard error/power theory of analysis is fatally 
flawed in its own terms, even when used as intended (Gorard, 2010). The accounts of 
hundreds of interviewees can be properly analysed as text, and the account of one 
case study can properly involve numbers. The supposed link between scale and 
paradigm is just an illusion.  
 
The logic of analysis is similar 
 
Another possible distinction between the q-word approaches is their method of 
analysis. Qualitative work is supposed to be subjective and so closer to a social world 
(Gergen & Gergen, 2000). Quantitative work is supposed to help us become 
objective (Bradley & Schaefer, 1998). This distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative analysis is exaggerated, largely because of widespread error by those who 
do handle numbers (Gorard, 2010) and ignorance of the subjective and interpretivist 
nature of numeric analysis by those who do not (Gorard, 2006). The similarities of 
the underlying procedures used are remarkable (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). Few 
analytical techniques are restricted by data gathering methods, input data, or by 
sample size. Most methods of analysis use some form of number, such as ‘tend’, 
‘most’, ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘none’, ‘few’ and so on (Gorard, 1997b). Whenever one talks of 
things being ‘rare’, ‘typical’, ‘great’ or ‘related’ this is a numeric claim, and can only 
be so substantiated, whether expressed verbally or in figures (Meehl, 1998). 
Similarly, quantification does not consist of simply assigning numbers to things, but 
of relating empirical relations to numeric relations (Nash, 2002). The numbers 
themselves are only valuable insofar as their behaviour is an isomorph of the qualities 
they are summarising. Statistical analysis is misunderstood by observers if they do 
not consider also the social settings in which it takes place, and the role of 
'qualitative' factors in reaching a conclusion (MacKenzie, 1999). Normal statistical 
textbooks describe ideal procedures to follow, but several studies of actual behaviour 
have observed different common practices among researchers. 'Producing a statistic 
is a social enterprise' (Gephart, 1988, p.15), and the stages of selecting variables, 
making observations, and coding the results, take place in everyday settings where 
subjective influences arise. It would be dishonest to pretend otherwise.  
15 
 
 
Even such an apparently basic operation as the measurement of a length involves 
acceptance of a series of theories and judgements about the nature of length and the 
isomorphic behaviour of numbers (Berka, 1984). As with ‘number’ and ‘length’, so 
also with many of our basic concepts and classifications for use in social science – 
‘sex’, ‘time’, ‘place’, ‘family’, ‘class’ or ‘ethnicity’ (Gorard, 2003). Measurement is 
an intrinsically intrepretivist process (Gorard, 2009). Personal judgement(s) lie at the 
heart of all research – in our choice of research questions, samples, questions to 
participants and methods of analysis – regardless of the kinds of data to be collected. 
The idea that the quantitative work is objective and qualitative is subjective is based 
on a misunderstanding of how research is actually conducted. 
 
 
Implications (if the argument so far is accepted) 
 
For the conduct of research 
 
Mixed methods are not a design. Nor do they represent some kind of paradigm, 
separate from those traditionally termed ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’. How could 
mixed methods be incommensurable with the two elements supposed to be mixed 
within them? Mixed methods are then just a description of how most people would 
go about researching any topic that they really wanted to find out about. The results 
of research if taken seriously affect the lives of real people, and lead to genuine 
expenditure and opportunity costs. We should be (nearly) as concerned about 
research as we are about investigations and decisions in our lives. It is instructive to 
contrast how we, as researchers, generally behave when conducting research 
professionally and how we behave when trying to answer important questions in our 
everyday lives. When we make real-life decisions about where to live, where to 
work, the care and safety of our children, the health of our loved ones, and so on, 
many of us behave very differently from being ‘researchers’. 
 
No one, on buying a house, refuses to discuss or even know the price, the mortgage 
repayments, the room measurements or the number of bathrooms. No one, on buying 
a house, refuses to visit the house, look at pictures of it, walk or drive around the 
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neighbourhood, or talk to people about it. All rational actors putting a substantial 
personal investment in their own house would naturally and without any 
consideration of paradigms, epistemology, identity or mixed methods, use all and any 
convenient data to help make up their mind. We will believe that the house is real 
even though external to us, and that it remains the same even when we approach it 
from different ends of the street. Thus, we would not start with ‘isms’. We would not 
refuse to visit the house, or talk to the neighbours about it, because we were 
‘quantitative’ researchers and did not believe that observation or narratives were 
valid or reliable enough for our purposes. We would not refuse to consider the 
interest rate for the loan, or the size of the monthly repayments, because we were 
‘qualitative’ researchers and did not believe that numbers could do justice to the 
social world. And we would naturally, even unconsciously, synthesise the various 
forms of data to reach a verdict. I do not mean to say that such real-life decisions are 
easy, but that the difficulties do not stem from paradigms and epistemology, but from 
weighing up factors like cost, convenience, luxury, safety etc. People would use the 
same naturally mixed approach when making arrangements for the safety of their 
children or loved ones, and for any information-based task about which they really 
cared. For important matters, we behave sensibly, eclectically, critically, sceptically, 
but always with that final leap of faith because research, however carefully 
conducted, does not provide the action - it only informs the action. We collect all and 
any evidence available to us as time and resources allow, and then synthesise it 
naturally, without consideration of mixing methods as such. 
 
Thus, I can envisage only two situations in which a social science researcher would 
not similarly use ‘mixed methods’ in their work. Perhaps they do not care about the 
results, and are simply pretending to do research (and wasting peoples’ time and 
money in the process). This may be a common phenomenon in reality. Or their 
research question is peculiarly specific, entailing only one method. However, the 
existence of this second situation, analogous to using only one tool from a larger 
toolbox, is not any kind of argument for separate paradigms of the two q-words and 
mixed methods. Mixed methods, in the sense of having a variety of tools in the 
toolbox and using them as appropriate, is the only sensible way to approach research. 
Thus, a central premise of mixed methods is that ‘the use of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research 
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problems than either approach alone’ (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.5). This is 
what I have always argued, but without the need to create a new paradigm (Gorard, 
1997a; Gorard with Taylor, 2004). Mixed methods (the ability to use any appropriate 
methods) is the only sensible and ethical way to conduct research.  
 
For ethical consideration of projects 
 
A key ethical concern for those conducting or using publicly-funded research ought 
to be the quality of the research, and so the robustness of the findings, and the 
security of the conclusions drawn. Until recently, very little of the writing on the 
ethics of education research has been concerned with quality. The concern has been 
largely for the participants in the research process, which is perfectly proper, but this 
emphasis may have blinded researchers to their responsibility to those not 
participating in the research process. The tax-payers and charity-givers who fund the 
research, and the general public who use the resulting public services, for example, 
have the right to expect that the research is conducted in such a way that it is possible 
for the researcher to test and answer the questions asked The general public, when 
this is demonstrated, are shocked to discover that they are funding the work of social 
scientists who either believe that everything can be encompassed in numbers, or 
much more often who believe that nothing can be achieved using numbers (or that 
nothing is true, or that there is no external world, or….).  
 
Generating secure findings for widespread use in public policy should involve a 
variety of factors including care and attention, sceptical consideration of plausible 
alternatives, independent replication, transparent prior criteria for success and failure, 
use of multiple complementary methods, and explicit rigorous testing of tentative 
explanations. The q-word paradigms are just a hindrance here, and so are unethical as 
originally suggested in (Gorard, 2002a, 2003), with this second principle of research 
ethics slowly filtering into professional guidelines (e.g. Social Research Association 
2003).  
 
For the development of new researchers 
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As I explained at the start of the chapter, I was lucky enough to be undamaged by 
supposed research methods development of the kind now compulsory for publicly-
funded new researchers in the UK. Or perhaps I was critical and confident enough to 
query what methods experts were saying and writing. Methods text, courses and 
resources are replete with errors and misinformation, such that many do more 
damage than good. Some mistakes are relatively trivial. I remember clearly being 
told by international experts that triangulation was based on having three points of 
view, or that the finite population correction meant that a sample must be smaller 
than proposed, for example. I have heard colleagues co-teaching in my own modules 
tell our students that regression is a test of causation (see also Robinson, et al. 2007), 
or that software like Nvivo will analyse textual data for them. Some examples are 
more serious. There is a widespread error in methods texts implicitly stating that the 
probability of a hypothesis given the data is the same as, or closely related to, the 
probability of the data given that the hypothesis is true. However, probably the most 
serious mistakes currently made in researcher development are the lack of awareness 
of design, and the suggestion that methods imply values, and are a matter of personal 
preference rather than a consequence of the problems to be overcome via research.  
 
Much research methods training in social science is predicated on the notion that 
there are distinct categories of methods such as ‘qualitative’ or ‘quantitative’. 
Methods are then generally taught to researchers in an isolated way, and this isolation 
is reinforced by sessions and resources on researcher identities, paradigms, and 
values. The schism between qualitative and quantitative work is very confusing for 
student researchers (Ercikan and Wolff-Michael, 2006). It is rightly confusing 
because it does not make sense. These artificial categories of data collection and 
analysis are not paradigms. Both kinds of methods involve subjective judgements 
about less than perfect evidence. Both involve consideration of quantity and of 
quality, of type and frequency. Nothing is gained by the schism, and I have been 
wrong in allowing publishers to use the q-words in the title of some of my books 
(altering ‘The role of number made easy’ to ‘Quantitative methods’, for example). 
Subsequently, many of the same methods training programmes taken by new 
researchers refer to the value of mixing methods, such as those deemed ‘qualitative’ 
or ‘quantitative’. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, this leads to further confusion. Better to 
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leave paradigms, schisms and mixing methods for later, or even leave them out of 
training courses altogether.  
 
It is not enough merely to eliminate the q-words from module headings and 
resources. The change has to be adopted by all tutors respecting every kind of 
evidence for what it is, and following this respect through in their own teaching and 
writing. This is what I have implemented successfully in both previous universities in 
which I have worked. It is what I am trying to implement in my current institution – 
encouraged as ever by national funding bodies, supported by the upper echelons of 
the university, and opposed by the least research-active of my colleagues who seem 
to want to cling their comforting paradigms, perhaps as an explanation for their 
unwillingness to conduct relevant, rigorous and ethical research. This is part of the 
reason why I would want research methods development for new researchers to be 
exclusively in the hands of the most successful practical researchers, who are often 
busy doing research, rather than in the hands of those supposed methods specialists, 
who are often unencumbered by research contracts and so free to corrupt the 
researchers of the future. Busy practical researchers will tend to focus on the craft, 
the fun, the importance and the humility of research. They will want new researchers 
to help them combat inequality, inefficiency, and corruption in important areas of 
public policy like health, education, crime and social housing. There is just no time to 
waste on meaningless complications and the cod philosophy of the q-word 
paradigms.  
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter looks at the idea of mixed methods approaches to research and 
concludes that this is the way new researchers would naturally approach the solution 
of any important evidence-informed problem. This means that a lot of the 
epistemology and identity routinely taught to new researchers is not just pointless; it 
may actually harm their development. The chapter reminds readers of the importance 
of research design, and how this neglected stage of the research cycle is completely 
independent of issues like methods of data collection and analysis. The schismic 
classifications of qualitative and quantitative work are unjustifiable as paradigms. 
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They are not based on the scale of the work, nor on different underlying logic of 
analysis. They are pointless. The chapter ends with some considerations of the 
implications for the conduct of publicly-funded research, for the ethics of social 
science, and for the preparation of new researchers. 
 
 
Related questions 
 
1. If the first principle of research ethics is not to harm research participants, 
how would you summarise the second principle discussed in ths chapter? 
2. Can all issues of research ethics be classified under these two principles, or 
are there more? 
3. Why do you think so many professional researchers think it is possible to 
claim that researchers should ignore either evidence in the form of text or 
evidence in the form of numbers? 
4. Try to imagine a real-life situation that is important to you in which you had 
to make an evidence-informed decision. What reason could you have for 
ignoring relevant evidence simply because it was numeric (or textual)? 
5. Look at some journals in your area of interest and consider how many papers 
use techniques based on random sampling theory (such as significance tests, 
standard errors, confidence intervals). How many of these actually had 
random samples, and how many were using these techniques erroneously? 
6. Look at some journals in your area of interest and consider how many papers 
using purportedly ’qualitative’ methods make either explicit or implicit 
comparative claims (over time, place or social group) without presenting any 
data from a comparator group? 
7. Examine the meaning and use of the term ’warrant’ in social science research. 
How useful is it for your own work? 
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